Andy


Andriy (Andy) Zapechelnyuk
School of Economics
University of Edinburgh
31 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh EH8 9JT
United Kingdom
Location: 31 Buccleuch Place, Room 4.01
Email: azapech (ατ) gmail.com
Phone: Microsoft Teams
I am a Professor of Economics at the University of Edinburgh. I got a PhD from Stony Brook University in 2005. Before landing at Edinburgh in 2022, I spent some time as a researcher at the Center for the Study of Rationality (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (University of Bonn), and I have taught at Kyiv School of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, University of Glasgow, and University of St Andrews.
My research interests lie in the field of microeconomic theory and applications, focusing on communication and information design, optimal contracts, and robust decision theory.
Working Papers
‣ Fair hiring (with Karl Schlag)
We investigate fairness of hiring procedures using a model of sequential search. To be fair means not to discriminate interviewed candidates based on their observable characteristics or by the order in which they are interviewed. We show that fair hiring prescribes to accept the first candidate who belongs to a prespecified set. Fair hiring strategy becomes a simple threshold strategy when the acceptance criterion admits a utility representation. Moreover, fair hiring comes at a relatively small cost. The optimal value of unconstrained hiring is at most twice that of fair hiring.
‣ Compromise, don't optimize: Generalizing perfect Bayesian equilibrium to allow for ambiguity (with Karl Schlag)
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players can have multiple priors. Players’ choices are based on the notions of complaints and compromises. Complaints come from hypothetical assessors who have different priors and evaluate the choices of the players. Compromises are choices that aim to make these complaints small. The resulting solution concept is called perfect compromise equilibrium. This generalizes perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We use this concept to provide first insights into how rich uncertainty influences Cournot and Bertrand markets, public good provision, Spence's job market signaling, bilateral trade with common value, and forecasting.
‣ Persuasion under insufficient reason (with Anton Kolotilin) [Slides]
‣ Bargaining under incomplete information with the help of delay (with Karl Schlag)
‣ Are there "Ratatouille" restaurants? On anticorrelation of food quality and hygiene (with Hisayuki Yoshimoto)
‣ Persuasion meets delegation (with Anton Kolotilin)
‣ Competing e-commerce intermediaries (with Alexander Matros)
Publications
‣ Constructive vs toxic argumentation in debates (with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
[merges two earlier working papers, A model of debates: Moderation vs free speech and Sequential obfuscation and toxic argumentation]
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (forthcoming)
‣ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
Economic Theory (forthcoming) [doi] [Open Access]
‣ Censorship as optimal persuasion
(with Anton Kolotilin and Tymofiy Mylovanov)
Theoretical Economics 17 (2022), 561-585 [Open Access]
(with Karl Schlag)
Theoretical Economics 16 (2021), 1431-1470 [Open Access]
[an earlier working paper version is here]
‣ Bayesian persuasion and information design: Perspectives and open issues
Introduction to the Special Issue on Communication and Persuasion
(with Emir Kamenica and Kyungmin Kim)
Economic Theory 72 (2021), 701-704 [doi]
‣ Optimal quality certification
American Economic Review: Insights 2 (2020), 161-176 [doi]
‣ Job search costs and incentives
(with Ro'i Zultan)
Economic Theory Bulletin 8 (2020), 181-202 [doi]
‣ Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
(with Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, and Ming Li)
Econometrica 85 (2017), 1949-1964 [doi]
‣ Optimal allocation with ex-post verification and limited penalties
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
American Economic Review 107 (2017), 2666-2694 [doi] [Online Appendix]
[earlier versions titled "Optimality of non-competitive allocation rules" and "Value of competition in allocation and search problems"]
(with Karl Schlag)
Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017), 145-169 [doi]
[an earlier version titled “Decision making in environments without priors”]
‣ An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring
Economics Letters 132 (2015), 24-27 [doi]
‣ Eliciting information from a committee
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 2049-2067 [doi]
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
International Economic Review 54 (2013), 769-785 [doi]
‣ No-regret dynamics and fictitious play
(with Yannick Viossat)
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 825-842 [doi]
‣ Decision rules revealing commonly known events
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
Economics Letters 119 (2013), 8-10 [doi]
‣ On the impossibility of achieving no regrets in repeated games
(with Karl Schlag)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81 (2012), 153-158 [doi]
‣ Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
(with Alexander Matros)
International Journal of Industrial Organization 29 (2011), 426-431 [doi]
‣ Bargaining with a property rights owner
(with Yair Tauman)
Games and Economic Behavior 70 (2010), 132-145 [doi]
‣ On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions
(with Yair Tauman)
International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010), 171-175 [doi]
‣ Better-reply dynamics with bounded recall
Mathematics of Operations Research 33 (2008), 869-879 [doi]
‣ Optimal fees in internet auctions
(with Alexander Matros)
Review of Economic Design 12 (2008), 155-163 [doi]
‣ Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
(with Pradeep Dubey and Ori Haimanko)
Games and Economic Behavior 54 (2006), 77-94 [doi]
Grants and Sponsored Events
‣ Project: Theoretical Foundations and Design of Persuasion Mechanisms (2017–2020)
Funded by Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)
Research Team:
- Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews)
- Hisayuki Yoshimoto (University of Glasgow)
- Anton Kolotilin (UNSW Sydney)
‣ Event: An online Inaugral Lecture on "Economics of Persuasion and Strategic Information Manipulation" (2021)
Organized by the University of St Andrews
‣ Event: Seminar Series on Communication and Persuasion (2020)
Sponsored by Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)
Co-organisers:
- Kyungmin Kim (Emory University)
- Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews)
‣ Event: Workshop on Political Economy, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow (2015)
Sponsored by Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (United Kingdom)
Co-organisers:
- Herve Moulin (University of Glasgow)
- Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews)
‣ Project: Agent-based Simulation of the Wholesale Electricity Market of Ukraine (2007–2009)
Funded by International Development Research Centre (Canada)
Research Team:
- Andy Zapechelnyuk (University of St Andrews)
- Valeriy Tsaplin (National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission, Ukraine)
- Iryna Sikora (Ricardo Energy & Environment)
Teaching
ECNM11023 Microeconomics 1 (Part B)
‣ Textbooks:
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) “Microeconomic Theory”.
Gibbons (1992) “Game Theory for Applied Economists”